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SUMMARY 
The devel opment and f l ight evaluation of a tracking- type windshiel d 
display f or use in a low- al t i tude bombing (LAB ) system are described. 
Initially it was thought that the use of this display would lead to an 
improvement over the standar d cross -pointer instrument in t he r epeatability 
of the spec i fied maneuver and to a conseQuent i mprovement in bombing 
accuracy . However) compari son of random bomb miss distances of practi ce 
bombs dropped in the present t est s showed littl e difference between the 
standard and the revised eQui pment . SubseQuent statistical analyses of 
r andom bomb errors indicated that the contribution of fli ght-path tracking 
inaccuracies were smal l for all test cases ) and t hat these errors could be 
attributed primarily to sources other than tracking - for example) to 
inac cur acies in t he prediction and compensation f or wind effects . Thus 
it appea red that any effects of the revised eQuipment on bombing accuracy 
were obscured by large random errors from othe r sources which were 
unaffected by changing to t he t racking- type wi ndshield di splay . 
The windshiel d displ ay was highly regarded by the pilots ) who con-
sidered i t a natural one to l earn and to fly with confidence . It thus 
appea r s tha t the windshield di splay might be fruitfull y applied to other 
ins t rument fli ght probl ems in which maneuver programming and tracking 
accuracy are of greater over-a l l importance . 
INTRODUCTION 
The design and f l ight evaluation of an airborne target simulat or for 
use in tracki ng studie s of fight er-type a i rpl anes equipped with optical 
gunsight s have recentl y been reported (ref . 1 ). I n t his eQuipment the 
targ8t a irpl ane was represented by a movabl e dot of light pro jected on 
the windshield of the test airplane . This simulated target dot ) which was 
tracked by the pilot with a fixed gunsight dot ) not onl y was stabilized 
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against own ship ' s oscillations, but could be programmed at precomputed 
rates in space to represent selected target maneuvers . This windshield 
tracking display can be thought of as forming a pitch and yaw flight-
attitude instrument . The moving target dot is oriented as specified by 
the program unit, while the fixed pip indicates the actual orientation 
of the aircraft reference line . Thus, tracking errors can be interpreted 
as pitch and yaw attitude errors. Since pilots were able to hold these 
attitude errors down to a few mils in various simulated target-tracking 
runs, it appeared that these programming and display principles might be 
applied with advantage to certain instrument flight problems. 
For the present investigation a low-altitude bombing problem was 
selected as an example for study of the instrument-flight application of 
target-Simulator principles . The low- altitude bombing (hereafter abbre-
viated LAB) attack requires the aircraft to approach the target at very 
low altitude and at high speed . At a predetermined point the pilot 
abruptly initiates a constant high-acceleration pull-up, continuing until 
the aircraft completes a half loop , and recovering with a diving roll- out 
for escape . A special pitch- attitude gyro mounted in the aircraft initi-
ates the bomb release automatically at a predetermined pitch angle during 
the pull-up, tlloftingtl the bomb toward the target. For a successful 
delivery, the aircraft must follow a specified variation with time of 
airspeed and normal acceleration, and must remain in the original vertical 
plane throughout the maneuver . In the conventional LAB system used by 
the Navy , the guidance information is presented to the pilot on a cross-
pointer indicator mounted in the aircraft instrument panel. The position 
of the horizontal needle represents normal-acceleration error as sensed 
by an accelerometer and bridge- balancing circuit . The position of the 
vertical needle represents combined roll- and yaw-angle error as sensed 
by a special gyro . In the windshield- display system to be described, the 
cross - pointer was replaced by a fixed and a moving dot on the windshield. 
The relative motions of the dots in elevation and azimuth were measures 
of acceleration and roll- yaw errors, respectively . In addition, the 
constant step- input acceleration command used with the standard system 
was replaced by a continuous time -history type of acceleration command. 
The equipment was designed and fabricated at Ames Aeronautical 
Laboratory and installed in a Grumman F9F-8 a irplane from Naval Air 
Development Squadron Five (VX- 5) at Moffett Field, California. Flight 
tests were conducted by VX-5 personnel with technical assistance from 
Ames . The flight tests were directed at establishment of appropriate 
system sensitivities, evaluation of pilots' ability to fly the prescribed 
maneuver, and a limited evaluation of mis s distances from practice bomb-
dropping tests conducted at the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, 
California . The equipment and flight-test results are described herein. 
Acknowledgement for valuable assistance is given to Lt. J. A. Sickel , 
USN, and Capt . G. J . Hogenmiller, USAF, the project pilots from Squadron 
VX-5. 
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DESCRIPTION OF APPARATUS 
Design Concepts 
A profile view of the flight path and the time histories of the 
acceleration and airspeed for an idealized low-altitude bombing attack 
are shown in figure 1. As the aircraft passes over a predetermined point', 
called the initiation point, the pilot depresses the stick switch which 
starts a timing mechanism. When an instrument indication is received, 
the pilot enters the maneuver by abruptly pulling up to 4g in two seconds. 
The pilot maintains 4g until limited by the decreasing maximum lift 
capability of the aircraft. The airplane is then flown along the buffet 
boundary to complete a half loop, and recovery is made with a diving 
roll-out for escape. The bomb is released during the 4g portion of the 
pull-up at a preselected angle ranging from 400 (termed medium angle or 
"loft" release) to 1200 (termed high angle or "over-the-shoulder" release, 
abbreviated O/S). 
The Aero leA Armament Control System, described in reference 2, is 
currently employed by the Navy to fly this attack. A simplified diagram 
of this system is shown in figure 2(a). The guidance information required 
to perform the maneuver of figure 1 is displayed to the pilot on a cross-
pointer indicator that is mounted in the instrument panel. The horizontal 
needle indicates errors in normal acceleration, and the vertical needle 
indicates combined errors of roll and yaw angles. The horizontal meter 
movement and the normal-accelerometer transducer are connected in a bridge 
circuit which is adjusted for balance when 4g is applied to the acceler-
ometer. Any deviation from 4g causes the meter to deflect from the zero 
position. In the roll-yaw indicator circuit, the two gyro gimbal pickoffs 
are in separate bridge arrangements, with the outputs combined for a single 
meter indication. The roll-yaw gyro is a free gyro with its spin axis 
mounted parallel to the pitch axis of the aircraft. The roll gimbal 
measures essentially the conventional roll or bank angle; however, the 
yaw gimbal does not measure the conventional heading angle or yaw, but 
rather the angle between the aircraft reference axis and the vertical 
reference plane, as measured in the inclined plane of the aircraft. In 
the operation of this equipment the pilot begins the maneuver by depress-
ing the stick switch. The pull-up command is indicated by the horizontal 
needle dropping to show a 3g error in acceleration. The pilot then 
attempts to pull up to 4g (and thus level the needle) in the required 
2 seconds. When the aircraft can no longer maintain 4g, the pilot dis-
regards the horizontal needle and flies along the buffet boundary. During 
this same period the pilot attempts to keep the vertical needle centered 
at all times. The bomb is released automatically at preset pitch angles 
by a separate pitch-attitude gyro. 
Practice bomb drops using this and similar equipment have often 
resulted in unacceptably large miss distances. At the time the present 
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investigati on wa s initiated, it was bel ieved that these excessive bombing 
errors were due in l a r ge part t o the inability of the pilot to repeat the 
specified maneuver . It appea red that maneuver repeatabil ity and, hence, 
bombing accuracy , might be improved through the use of a more practical 
and accurately specifi ed accel eration- command pattern and repl acement of 
the small cross -pointer instrument with a l arge and sensitive tracking-
type display . 
The Ames wi ndshi el d displ ay was des i gned with these thoughts in mind. 
To facilitate comparisons of the two syst ems and to minimize development 
difficulties , much of the standard LAB system was retained . The system 
transducers and signal flow patterns are essentially identical, as are 
the cockpit operations and procedures . The primary differences are the 
replacement of the cross -pointer by a two- dot tracking- type display and 
the substit ut ion of a precision programming device for the step- input 
constant g command . A simplified diagram of the windshield- display 
system is shown in figure 2 (b ). The programmer (fig . 3) 'consists of a 
motor- driven face cam which has been profiled in proportion to the desired 
acceleration time hist ory in figure 1 and a follower which positions an 
electrical pickoff . Thi s output is compared continuously with that from 
an acceleromet er transducer similar to that used in the standard system. 
The resulting acceleration error signal is used to drive the display . In 
an effort to reduce an early tendency of the pilots to fly bias accelera-
tion errors , an accel eration- error- signal integrator was added during the 
program, and was used on a number of flights . In effect, it adds a displ ay 
actuating signal proportional to the time integral of acceleration error . 
Roll and yaw error signals are provided by a gyro unit identical to that 
used in the standard system. The error signals are sent to an optical 
display unit which was constructed from components of an A- l armament 
control system (fig . 4) . Here , a servo- driven gimballed mirror displ aces 
a moving dot on the windshield i n proportion to the error Signal s, in 
elevation for acceleration errors and in azimuth for combined roll- yaw 
errors . Controls were provided t o enable the pilot to make independent 
adjustment of acceleration , roll, and yaw error sensitivities (dot motion 
per unit error) over wide ranges . The sight head al so provides , through 
the use of a fixed mirror , the second dot which serves as a fixed instru-
ment reference . Thus , the pilot ' s task is to track continuously the 
moving dot with the f i xed dot to minimize deviations from the desired 
maneuver . The system block diagram of figure 5 and various components are 
described in more detail in t he Appendix . 
Installation in the Test Airplane 
The Ames windshield- display LAB system was installed in a Grumman 
F9F-8 aircraft, BuAer No . 131086, assigned to Navy Squadron VX-5 (fig. 6). 
A close -up view of the equipment mounted in t he nose of the airplane is 
shown in figure 7. All the ammunition containers and some of the 
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ammunition feed chutes were removed to make room for the installation. 
With the exception of the cockpit units and acceleration transducer, the 
entire system - the inverter, electronics, power supplies, switching 
circuits , and the complete instrumentation system - was located in the 
nose. The acceleration transducer was mounted in the nose wheel well 
about 3 feet forward of the aircraft center of gravity. Figure 8 is a 
photograph of the modified sight- head installation used to project the 
windshield display. The sight head was mounted behind the instrument 
panel flush with the instrument shroud . The camera's combining glass 
forms the dot images for recording purposes, while the pilot's combining 
glass forms the dot images for direct viewing by the pilot. Both combin-
ing glasses had partially silvered surfaces to increase the apparent dot 
brilliance. The silvering on the pilot's glass was limited to a square 
inch so as not to impair normal forward visibility. The pilot's control 
panel (mounted in the right-hand cockpit console) is shown in figure 9. 
Located here were all the operational controls for the windshield display, 
except for the program initiation switch, which was located on the control 
stick . 
Instrumentation 
The windshield- display eqUipment included provlslons for a recording 
oscillograph system . A sample record from the NACA nine-channel color 
oscillograph is shown in figure 10, in which the various traces are 
identified. Two other standard NACA recording instruments monitored air-
speed, altitude, and normal acceleration. A chronometric instrument pro-
vided time correlation of all the records. The 16mm GSAP motion-picture 
camera shown in figure 5 photographed the dot motions at 16 frames per 
second as seen by the pilot . Selected frames of a typical run are shown 
in figure 11. 
TESTS, RESULTS , AND DISCUSSION 
The final portion of the flight - test program consisted of practice 
bomb drops made with the windshield- display low-altitude bombing system. 
These tests and a comparison of the miss-distance results with those from 
similar tests using the standard LAB system will be presented first. Prior 
to these final tests it was necessary , owing to the novelty of the Ames 
system, to perform extensive preliminary flight tests in order to famil-
iarize the pilots with the new equipment and establish suitable values of 
system parameters. These tests will also be described and discussed, since 
they not only are pertinent to the present miss-distance evaluation but 
may also be of interest in other possible applications of the windshield-
display concept. 
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Miss-Distance Evaluation Using Practice Bombs 
Test conditions.- The bomb-drop tests using the windshield-display 
system were conducted on the C range, Naval Ordnance Test Station, China 
Lake, California. This range is situated on a flat desert area at 
2,300 feet elevation and consists of target, control tower, and several 
spotting towers for measuring the position of bomb impacts by triangula-
tion. Extending for 40,000 feet north and south of the target is a 
straight cleared path over which the approach to the target by the attack-
ing aircraft is always made. Because of the initial low altitude of the 
maneuver, convection turbulence became severe during the heat of the day. 
To minimize rough-air effects, flight operations were begun shortly after 
dawn and were terminated at 11:00 a.m . ; even so, several flights were 
terminated earlier because of severe turbulence. 
The flight procedures used by S~uadron VX-5 in evaluatjng the stand-
ard LAB system accuracies were used in the windshield-display-system 
bomb-drop tests. Runs on the target were made over the cleared path at 
an altitude of 100 feet and true airspeed of 450 knots. The program was 
initiated over a predetermined point marked by a brightly colored pylon 
for the loft delivery or directly over the target for the over-the-shoulder 
delivery. The aircraft was e~uipped to carry six 25-pound Mark 76 practice 
bombs which were released singly. The runs were made from alternate 
directions until all six bombs were expended. Under unusual lighting 
conditions it was sometimes necessary to perform all runs in one direction 
to avoid making the pull-up directly into t he sun. 
There were 14 practice bomb- drop flights made with the windshield-
display system, with a total of 84 bombs dropped; 72 of these were useful 
for analysis purposes. Several of the bombs were eliminated from t he 
analysis because of faulty pull-ups or initial miscalculation of the wind, 
errors which put the drops outside the target area . The flight tests were 
divided among the four major test conditions: 
l. Loft release, integrator in (integrator connected) 
2. Loft release, integrator out (integrator disconnected) 
3 . Over the shoulder, integrator in 
4. Over the shoulder, integrator out 
As discussed later, display sensitivities were held constant at previously 
selected values . For comparison, miss data for a representative sample 
were selected from a large number of bombs dropped by Navy S~uadron VX-5 
during an extensive evaluation of the standard LAB system. The same two 
pilots made the standard system drops over the same time span in the same 
type of aircraft. These pilots differed primarily in their experience 
levels with the windshield-display systemj their experience with the normal 
system was about the same. One pilot conducted all the early evaluation 
and test f l ights of the Ames system, whil e the other pilot trained speci-
ficall y as a second pilot for the later bomb- drop tests. 
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Measured miss distances .- Tabl e I presents the basic bomb-drop data 
for both the windshield- display and normal system. The data are grouped 
according to flights, and the flights are grouped according to test 
conditions . The "Direction" col umn indicates the direction from which 
the run was initiated. "Range" is the miss distance along the aircraft 
line of flight, while "Deflection" is the miss distance at right angles 
to the line of flight, both taken from range measurements. The sign 
notation is conventional , forward and right being positive with respect 
7 
to the run direction . In the reduction of these raw data, methods similar 
to those used by Squadron VX-5 were employed. To illustrate, figure 12 
is a bomb plot for a typical flight , in which three bombs were dropped 
from one direction and three dropped from the opposite direction. The 
coordinates of the mean point of impact (m. p . i.) for all six bombs are 
termed "wind error ," ascribed primarily to an error in estimating the 
average wind velocity during the period of flight. The coordinates of 
the m.p .i. for each group of three bombs, referred to the total m.p.i., 
are "system error," ascribed to systematic errors in the bombing system 
for that particular flight . The deviations of the individual bomb impact 
points from these group m.p . i. are termed "random errors ," associated with 
variations from run to run . In the present case, emphasis was directed 
at anal ysis of random errors since, presumably, they are the only ones 
that would be affected appreciably by the variations in the LAB display 
system used in the present study. Range and deflection components of 
these random errors are tabulated in table I. 
In addition to the random errors discussed above, a correction was 
made to t he range - error component. This correction was made to compensate 
for a progressive range error between successive runs in the same direc -
tion, an effect noticed by the pilots during these flights . Review of 
the data verified this observation for both windshield-display and standard 
LAB systems . For example, examination of the south and north runs (runs 1, 
3, 5 and 2, 4, 6, respectively) range errors for flights 10 and 11 shows 
a definite progression. Further examination indicated that these increases 
in range error from run to run were associated with changes in airplane 
gross weight due to fuel consumption during the test flight . Although 
this trend is not apparent in all flights (e. g ., flight 13), it is believed 
that under more carefully controlled conditions it could be considered a 
predictable error rather than a random error of interest in the present 
investigation. This involved finding t he average change between succes -
sive runs for all the flights of one flight condition, then applying this 
correction to each run. Although the data available from the present tests 
were not sufficient to permit accurate corrections, approximate corrections 
were applied to the range and radial errors. In addition to the tabular 
data, figure 13 presents plots of corrected random miss data grouped by 
flight condition. There is no separation by pilots because any small 
differences were submerged in random errors. The form of the probability 
distribution of range and deflection miss components about the m.p.i. are 
of interest for further statistical analysis which is discussed laterj 
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accor dingly, the corrected data were also plott ed on pr obabi l ity paper , 
which yi elds a straight- line plot for normally dis tributed sampl es . 
Example probabil ity plots are shown i n figure 14 . 
The results of all the practice bomb drops a r e summar i zed in tabl e I I . 
Here the standard deviation of t he range and defl ection components is given 
for each of the flight conditions . For each case t he st andard deviations 
of the miss components wer e computed from t he equations 
I Cx - xn)2 
<Jx m 
Ln 
m 
and 
LCy - yn)2 
m 
<Jy 
I n 
m 
where xn and Yn are t he mean values (coordi nates of the m.p . i . ) for 
each group of n bombs dropped i n one di rection during a fli ght , x and y 
are range and def l ection coordinate s of an individual bomb i mpact, and 
m i s t he number of groups in each case . The mean r adi al error (m. r.e .), 
also given in table II, was computed f r om t he formula 
LAx -xS + & -yn)2 
m. r . e . m Ln 
m 
As a check un t hese numeri cal calculat i ons , the standard deviations of x 
and y were also de r i ved from the fai red cumulative probabil i t y curves , 
such as f i gure 14 . Values det ermined in this manner agreed with the values 
t abulat ed in t abl e II wi thin 2 percent . The m. r . e . value s were successfully 
checked in a similar manne r . 
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In the discussion of the measured bomb miss distances, attention will 
be concentrated on the m.r.e. data of table II, the final measure of random 
bomb error. These m.r . e . data give apparently conflicting impressions of 
the effect of the normal -accel eration- error integrator on the windshiel d-
display- system results. In the over- the-shoulder (O/S), integrator- out 
maneuver, the m. r.e. was less, primaril y due to a large reduction in the 
measured deflection errors . This reduction is believed to be of doubtful 
significance since the displ ay roll - yaw channel and the associated track-
ing problem were identical for the two cases and since the integrator - out 
results are based on only 11 test drops. The large difference in the 
number of runs was not intentional, but arose from difficulties in con-
trolling the flight program at a distant station. For the loft maneuver, 
the greater m.r. e . with integrator out is due primarily to larger measured 
range components. However, this was one of the conditions where the gross 
weight error correction was large so that the resulting m. r.e . was virtu-
ally the same . Since from the above discussion it does not appear that 
the integrator has a large effect, the integrator- in and -out data have 
been combined to facilitate comparison with the standard LAB system data . 
A comparison of the windshield display to the standard system in 
table II shows the trends to be the same for either the measured m.r.e. 
or the m.r. e . corrected for gross weight . For the O/S maneuver the wind-
shield display shows a modest reduction in m. r.e . over the standard 
system . No definite or readily apparent reason can be given for this 
effect of flight maneuver on the relative performance of the two systems . 
The improvement shown by the windshield display for the longer O/S maneuver 
may be attributed to the refined programming and sensitive display; however, 
these apparent advantages may not have much effect on the loft maneuver 
where the time is so short (approximately 7 seconds) and the initial 
acceleration rise so abrupt that experienced pilots appear to fly the 
maneuver with little real use of the instruments. 
Analyses of miss distances. - The relatively small differences between 
the m.r .e . value s for the windshield display and the standard system were 
rather surprising in view of the major changes in display , maneuver pro-
gramming, and associated pilot techni~ue. This lack of improvement in 
bombing accuracy led to the suspicion that the inability to repeat precisely 
the acceleration and roll - yaw time history is only one of several poten-
tially significant sources of error . Presumably, the only source of bomb 
error directly affected by test changes in the LAB system flight display 
would be the accuracy and repeatability with which the selected test 
maneuver could be flown, in terms of the tracking errors, that is, the 
difference between desired and measured normal acceleration, roll - and 
yaw-angle time histories . Accordingly, the estimate of the bomb miss due 
to tracking errors was of interest in attempting to interpret and compare 
the measure random bomb errors . With this in mind , tracking- error time 
histories, such as those in figures 16 , were derived from oscillograph 
records (fig . 10) for each bomb run . These data were then used in various 
computational procedures designed to "predict" the bomb miss associated 
with tracking errors alone . 
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No strong and consistent positive correlation between measured and 
predicted bomb miss distances was ever attained, despite numerous plausible 
variations made in the prediction method . In all cases, the standard 
deviation of the predicted bomb miss due to tracking errors was much less 
than the measured value, in most cases from one fifth to one half. Analy-
sis indicated, as discussed in more detail later, that tracking errors 
made only a small contribution to the mea sured random bomb miss, so that 
strong correlation could not be expected in any prediction method of this 
type . In view of these negative results, no effort will be made to 
describe computational details involved in the various attempted prediction 
methods. 
The fact that the predicted values of random bomb error were in all 
cases much l ess than the measured error strengthened the suspicion that 
sources other than tracking accuracies were responsible for the major 
portion of the error. Accordingly , the random bombing errors associated 
with factors other than normal - acceleration tracking performance were 
estimated, and the resultant error was compared with the measured data of 
table II. For these calculations, it was assumed that, as indicated by 
figure 14, the range and deflection components of the random bomb error 
were normall y distributed and were the summation of errors from a number 
of sources, each statistically independent and normally distributed . Then 
the usual standard-deviation eQuation applies, for example: 
where cra,crb'crc are the standard deviations of the bomb error due to each 
source a ,b, c . Sample calculations for range error sources other than 
display tracking are summarized in the following tabl e : 
Estimate of bomb range errors 
Assumed cr of Bomb range err or per cr of 
Error source error source unit source error bomb error ft 
variations Loft O/S Loft O/S 
Initiation time 0.1 sec 750 ft/sec 750 ft/sec 75 75 
Release time 0.02 sec 270 ft/sec 2810 ft/sec 5 56 
Wind 1 knot 59 ft/knot 79 ft/knot 59 79 
Airspeed 3 knots 54 ft/knot 34 ft/knot 162 102 
Bomb dispersion 5 mils (0.2870 ) 25 ft/deg 220 ft/deg 7 63 
Zcr2 34,424 29,375 
Resultant cr, ft 185 171 
CONFIDENTIAL 
NACA RM A56I10 CONFIDENTIAL 
The error sour ces listed a re those that came readily to mind and 
which had an appreciable effect on bomb range error. Then the assumed 
standard deviation cr for each error source was based on experi ence 
gained in the present bomb -drop test and on availabl e LAB data . 
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1 . Initiati on time: This error arises from the i nability of the 
pilot t o begin the maneuver a t the exact instant the airpl ane passes over 
the selected initiation poi nt . 
2 . Release time : This error is attri butabl e to variations i n 
release times from the correct val ue due to slight resolution errors in 
the bomb - release gyr o and assoc i ated mechanisms. 
3 . Wi nd : Wind error refers to variations from run to run in the 
range component of t he prevailing average wi nd . 
4. Airspeed : The errors i n a irspeed represent deviations from t he 
aver age at t he i nst ant of release . 
5. Bomb dispersion: This error i s caused by i ndi vi dual bomb charac -
teristics and is expr essed in terms of bomb flight -path angle aft er release. 
The a ssumed standard deviations for i nitiati on time and a irspeed were 
e stimated from data obtained duri ng the present investigation) while the 
r emai ning items were esti mat ed from general experi ence . High preci s i on 
is not claimed for t hese estimates but they are beli eved to be conser va-
tive and reasonable . The bomb range error per unit error for each source 
was derived from known informati on about the selected airplane maneuver 
and from practice bomb - trajectory data obtai ned through Squadron VX- 5 . 
The cr of the bomb r ange e rror is) of course) the product of this error 
ratio and the assoc i ated assumed cr of the error source . The resultant cr ) 
equal to t he square r oot of the sums of the squares ) i s the standard devia-
tion of the bomb range error resulting from the combination of t hese five 
tabula ted error sources . Although t he individual error contri butions 
differ between loft and O/S maneuver cases) the resultant cr i s about 
the same) due to compensat ing effects. Comparison of these resultant cr 
values with the corresponding crx data corrected for gr oss we i ght from 
table II shows tha t the order of magni tude is about the same f or all ca ses) 
even though the effects of normal - acceleration tracking errors were not 
included i n the es timati on procedure . This result is consistent with the 
results of t he previ ously described attempts to predict bomb range error 
from measur ed normal - accelerati on tracking data) a procedure which yielded 
miss values cons istently much smaller than measured . For exampl e) the 
addition of even the largest predi cted cr of 75 feet due to acceleration 
tracking error to the cr est i mat ed above from other sources gives the 
fol l owi ng : For l oft) 
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and for O/S ) 
If the resultant Gx is considered as a total predicted random bomb 
range error ) it is seen that the net ef fect of the tracking- error contri -
bution is only 200 - 185 = 15 fee t for t he l oft ) or 187 - 171 = 16 feet 
for O/S . These cal culations a l so help t o explain the difficulty experi-
enced in attempting to correlate the predicted bomb miss due to tracking 
error with the measured misses ; under these conditions ) only small posi-
tive correl ation could be expect ed even with the most favorable practical 
experiment . Applications of simil ar procedure to defl ection errors lead 
to resul ts which were qualitat ively similar to those above . 
Thus it appears that ) contrary to original belief ) tracking errors 
are only one of several sizable sources of random bomb miss. Hence ) any 
equipment such as t he windshield- display system ) which is designed sol ely 
to improve tracking performance ) cannot be expected to give any striking 
reduction in random mis s . The apparent differences and inconsistencies 
between the bomb- mi ss data of t abl e II for the various flight conditions 
thus may be due primaril y t o chance fl i ght-to- flight variations in any of 
several error sources ) r ather than t o significant differences in tracking 
performance (particularly in view of t he small number of runs for s ome 
flight conditions ) . 
From the operational s t andpoint ) the importance of random bomb error 
due t o tracking err or woul d be even less than indicated . For exampl e ) in 
predicting the miss - distance stat i s tics of bombs to be dropped in dist ant 
territory ) allowance must be made not only for the random miss of a group 
of bombs from an m.p . i . ) but al so for random errors in estimating the 
m.p .i . i tsel f . These l a t ter e r rors can arise from conti nual changes in 
" sys t em" e r rors and from errors i n predicting winds over a t arget) a diffi-
cult task even in friendly areas . Brief consideration of avail abl e data ) 
including t ha t f r om the present bomb drops ) indicates that these errors 
may wel l be cons ide r abl y l arger than the random bomb error . I n fact ) the 
present dat a i ndicate that reduction in such errors i n est~ting the 
m.p .i . is of greater practical i mportance than the reduction of random 
error s about t he m.p . i .) such as the rel ativel y small ones associat ed 
with t he tracking i naccuracies of ini tial concern in this present study . 
Further det ail ed anal ysis of the rel ati ve tracking abil ity with the two 
systems was not cons idered warrant ed s ince ) in this particular appl ication) 
the tracking- error contr ibution t o t he end result was small. 
Equipment Devel opment Flights 
As has j u s t been discussed ) the wi ndshiel d displ ay did not give sig-
nificant improvement from t he bomb accuracy standpoint. However) experience ; 
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with this equipment indicated that equipment employing similar display 
principles might be profitably applied to other flight problems, particu-
larly where continuous and precise control of the flight path is of 
.greater over-all importance. The following discussion of pilot opinion, 
tracking performance and experience gained in the development of this 
equipment may be of value in this connection. 
Selection of display sensitivities.- Display sensitivity is the 
angular displacement of the moving- dot instrument index per unit of error: 
in the elevation channel, the vertical displacement in milliradians per g 
unit errorj and in the deflection channel, the horizontal displacement in 
milliradians per degree yaw error or degree roll error. The selection of 
sensitivity values for use in the final evaluation of practice bomb-miss 
distances was based on pilots' opinions of the ease of tracking the wind-
shield display and on the acceleration, yaw, and roll errors which should 
be minimized to insure repeatable maneuvers. In this equipment the sensi-
tivity could be varied over a continuous range from zero to exceedingly 
high values. Therefore, in initial flights a range of probable useful 
values was given to the pilot as a general guide for investigation. As 
flight tests progressed, the pilot narrowed these initial values to a 
range of useful sensitivities . Following these tests, check flights by 
other pilots were made to verify these settings. The sensitivities deter-
mined during these tests are as follows: 
Pitch sensitivity •. 
Yaw sensitivity . 
Roll sensitivity 
44 milliradians per g unit error 
17 milliradians per deg yaw error 
7 milliradians per deg roll error 
In selecting the display sensitivities for use in later bomb-drop 
tests, the maximum usable values were limited by excessive high- frequency 
dot motion in rough air, which made it difficult for the pilot to detect 
the desired flight indications. Lower settings, of course, reduce dot 
excursions due to rough air and improve the tracking in terms of dot 
displacement. In the extreme, apparent tracking errors would approach 
zero as the sensitivity approached zero, but the associated normal accel-
eration and roll-yaw errors would be very large. Extensive study of the 
variation of the actual tracking errors with sensitivity was beyond the 
scope of the present study , but it appeared that they could not be reduced 
significantly by changing sensitivities from the selected values which are 
the maximum usable under rough-air conditions. Filters probably could be 
designed for the mirror servo loop which would reduce the hjgh-frequency 
dot motion due to rough air without appreciable attenuation of tracking-
control dot motions, thus permitting the use of higher sensitivities. 
Effects of simple adjustments were considered briefly, but no time was 
available for extensive development. 
It is interesting to interpret the selected sensitivities in terms 
of thresholds detected by the pilots. The diameter of the moving dot is 
about 2 milliradians, and a tracking error of one dot diameter was readily 
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apparent t o the pilot . The highly sensit ive nature of this displ ay is 
apparent when t hi s dot-width error is converted into the f l ight quantities 
of 0 . 046g accel e r ation error , 0 .12° yaw error , and 0 . 28° roll error . 
The r atio ' of 0 . 280 r oll to 0 .120 yaw is of the same order as t he 
roll - yaw signal rat io of 3 to 1 used in the standard system . If the 
steady- stat e approx imation is made so that the rate of yaw correction is 
proport ional t o bank angl e , the addition of the roll - angl e term to the 
azimuth dot moti on can be thought of as providing the pilot with a l ead 
term . This ha s an effect simil ar to t hat of elevating a f i xed gunsight 
above the airpl ane reference axi s ; here , banking motions not onl y are a 
measur e of the eventual azimut h correct ion rate , but a l so provide an 
apparent azimut h tra cking correction proportional t o t he bank angle . 
Moderate el evation of a gunsight (which gives equival ent roll- yaw ratios 
of the order used with the LAB system) has been found general ly beneficial 
to tracking . 
Modifi cation of acceleration program . - The specified LAB maneuver 
call s for a smooth pull -up entry from 19 to 4g in 2 seconds . The orig-
inal windshiel d- displ ay system cam profil e is shown in figure 15 (a ). The 
smooth asymmet rical S curve used fo r the entry portion was sel ected as 
a reasonabl e approximation to t he normal - accel erati on patt ern as measured 
in abrupt pull-ups made using normal control t echniques . Difficulty in 
foll owing thi s abrupt command was experienced duri ng initial f l ights . I n 
the hope of faci l itat ing cl oser and more consistent tracki ng , a cam with 
a modified entry profil e was constructed in which the S shaped entry 
portion was l engthened to 2 . 5 seconds (f i g . 15 (b )) . 
The final portion or tail of the cam was originally t apered 
(fig . 15(a ) ) to correspond to the drop- off in maximum usabl e total lift 
associated wit h the est imat ed sizabl e reduction in indicated airspeed 
during the l att er portion of the maneuver . On the basis of early experi -
ence with the airpl ane , the pil ots believed it would be possible to hold 
4g throughout the 1800 pitch maneuver . Accordingly , the tail portion 
of the cam with t he modified entry pr of ile was left constant a t 4g 
(fig . 15 (b)) . 
Subsequent f l ight tests with the modified cam showed that , contrary 
to expectations , the pil ots preferred the 2- second cam and (after pract ice ) 
were abl e to fly smoother and more repeatabl e maneuvers with the original 
abrupt ent ry . Apparentl y the control motions and associated airpl ane 
response with t he original cam corresponded more cl osely to those used 
natur ally by a pil ot for any abrupt pull- Up . In addition , the tapering 
of the final portion of the g command was found to be essential, as it 
was not poss ible to hol d t he constant 4g call ed for by the modified cam . 
In fact , the shape of the original cam was found to be just inside the 
airpl ane buffet boundary . For these reasons , the original cam profile 
(fig . 15 (a ) ) was sel ected for use in all subsequent bomb- drop tests . 
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Measured tracking performance. - The flight-test program of the 
windshield- display system, including the practice bomb drops, encompassed 
over 60- flights and more than 600 pull-up maneuvers. From the numerous 
records obtained, several interesting trends were noticed in the measured 
tracking, particularly in pitch - that is, the nature and magnitude of 
t he errors between actual and desired acceleration . Typical variations 
in normal -acceleration tracking performance assoc i ated with various pilot 
techniques, system configurations, and atmospheric conditions are shown 
in figure 16 . With the standard system (fig . 16(a)), the measured accel-
eration was usually quite smooth but was often less than the desired 
value in the middle portion of the run . It is believed that this differ-
ence between desired and actual acceleration is due not only to the 
coarseness of the acceleration error indication, but also to difficulty 
in maintaining an accurate calibration of the accelerati on error channel. 
For the windshield display with the acceleration error integrator out, 
figure 16 (b), the normal acceleration patterns were characterized by a 
short lag behind the command during the entry period. During the middle 
portion the long-term acceleration errors were held quite small, but at 
the expense of increased hi gher frequency deviations, an effect probably 
associated with the pilots ' efforts to track closely when using this 
highly sensitive display . Addition of the integrated-error signal 
(fig . l6 (c)) resulted in a tendency to overshoot the specified 4g in 
the maneuver entry, an effect normally associated with the addition of a 
lag term in a closed-loop system. It did not result in the hoped-for 
reduction of bias errors, which i n initial tests were high with the 
integrator-out system. In fact, the tracking errors with the i ntegrator 
in appeared to be larger and slightly more oscillatory than with the 
integrator out, and the pilots reported somewhat more difficulty in 
tracking . Once this tendency toward acceleration bias errors was called 
to their attention, and as they gained flight experience, they were able 
to hold it to satisfactorily low levels without the integ~ator . Conse -
quently, extensive development of the integrated-error concept was 
abandoned . 
The effect of rough air on the windshield-display-system tracking 
is shown i n figure 16 (d) for the integrator - out case. A lag in initiating 
the maneuver is apparentj this effect is associated primarily with the 
pilot ' s difficulty in detecting the acceleration command in the midst of 
sizable random normal accelerations and dot motions caused by the rough 
air. It is seen that the pilot applied acceleration rapidly to reach the 
command, but had subsequent difficulty in stabilizing about 4g . The 
normal- acceleration errors were reduced later in the run since the air 
smootbed out with increasing altitude, and the problem became one of 4g 
tracking . Figure 16 (e) shows an interesting effect that was sometimes 
observed when the pilot attempted to track the moving dot very tightly. 
Poorly damped oscillations of about 1 cycle per second are readily 
apparent . This oscillation seemed to be associated with a combination of 
the airplane longitudinal shor-c-period oscillation of about the same fre -
quency and the pilot ' s difficulty in controlling at this high frequency, 
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particularl y through an airplane control system with dynamic imperfections. 
As discussed previousl y , the pilots had difficulty in following the initial 
acceleration rise when it was spread out over a 2-1/2- second period 
(fig . 15 (b )) . The exampl e acceleration time history of figure 16 (f ) shows 
the typical "hitch" in the accel eration entry curve due apparently to his 
fear of overshooting this more gradual acceleration command . 
The normal - accelerati on tracking performance with the windshield-
displ ay system as finall y used in the practice bomb drops is summarized 
in figure 17. These data , in the form of time histories of average normal 
accelerations and root -mean- square deviations from this mean value, are 
based on the data from only the 14 bomb -drop flights . Here the system 
configuration was held constant and only two pilots who used similar 
tracking techni ques were i nvolved . The air roughness varies from slight 
t o moderate for the flights in this summary . It is seen that for both 
integrator in and out the curves are much the same, except for a sl ightly 
greater tendency with i ntegrator i n to overshoot the desired 4g at about 
3 seconds . 
The inabili ty to keep up with the initial command is reflected in 
peak acceleration errors of about - 0 . 4g to -0 . 5g at 1 .5 seconds . The 
error is first reduced to zero at 2-1 /2 seconds . Then as time increases 
toward 10 seconds there is a trend toward increasingly negative error . 
As seen from figure 17 (a ) , a t 10 seconds the acceleration command starts 
to reduce , resulting in a brief period of positive error around 12 seconds 
until the pilot readjusts . 
The standard devi ation cr of the error from the mean value is seen 
to range from around ±0 . 3g near the start of the run to as l ow as ±O. l g 
late r in the run . The values of cr with integrator in are slightly 
greater than with integrator out, reflecting the pilots f opinion that the 
tracking was easier with the i ntegrator out . It might be noted that the 
cr boundaries of normal acceleration can be interpreted as enclosing 
68 . 3 percent of the test points, indi cative of the repeatability from 
run to run . 
The rol l -yaw tracki ng errors were generally small (less than ±l . OO ) 
and did not appear to be strongly influenced by display or flight condi -
tions . One notable excepti on was the effect of airplane yaw-damper 
operation . Example yaw- error t i me histories shown in figure 18 illustrate 
the small virtually undamped yawing oscil lations which were evident with 
the yaw damper i noperati ve, particularl y in rough air . I n all cases these 
roll - yaw tracking errors appeared to have little effect on random bomb 
errors . 
Pilot oplnl ons .- During the course of the fli ght program, an effort 
was made to obt ai n pilot comments on the advantages , defi Ciencies, and 
possibl e modifi cations of the windshi eld- display system. In addition to 
the present LAB maneuver , comments rel ati ng to other possible appli cations 
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were also of interest. After completion of all flight tests by VX- 5 
pilots, two local evaluation flights were made by Ames pilots . While they 
did not have any previous LAB experience, both had wide experience in 
tracking research studies including the target-simulator program (ref. 1). 
Low- altitude bombing maneuvers were performed on both the standard and 
windshield-display systems for pilot comment only, based on their experi -
ence with similar displays at the Laboratory. The following discussion 
is a consensus of all VX- 5 and Ames pilots involved in the test program . 
The pilots appreciated the large and sensitive nature of the moving-
dot displ ay, and considered it a natural, easily interpreted way of com-
bining pitch and yaw flight i nformation . Since these tests were performed 
over a familiar and unobstructed path, the pilots felt safe in concentrat-
ing on the dot-tracking probl em with little reference to the outside world. 
However, when the pilot attempts this half loop in combat over unfamiliar 
terrain, the ease with which he can monitor the surroundings and transfer 
from instrument to visual orientation might be an important advantage of 
the windshiel d display . The pil ots also felt that this visual flight 
monitori ng feature might be very useful in other possible applications, 
such as l anding- approach instrumentation where a difficult transition 
from instrument to visual orientation is required. The flexibility of the 
continuous programming principle enhances the application to radically 
different and more difficult flight maneuvers . 
The pilots offered numerous suggestions for modifications to the 
windshi eld display itself, but these were not considered essential to the 
present expl oratory investigatj.on . The displ aying on the windshiel d of 
airspeed or airspeed error was considered a desirable addition to reduce 
the distraction of reading a separate standard airspeed indicator. There 
were several widely differing suggestions dealing with the addition of 
roll- ori entation information , these ranging from a simple vertical refer-
ence line fixed in the airpl ane to "wings" on the moving dot; the latter 
would not only provide a bank reference but would permit programming of 
the roll- out required for recovery from the LAB maneuver . The replacement 
of the fixed dot with a small circle was considered desirable to improve 
definiti on o I ncreased displ ay brilliance and heavier sunlight filtering 
were considered essential for daylight operational use . These improvements 
and changes to the display probably could be accomplished more readily 
through the use of a cathode- ray tube of the projection type or the f l at-
screen type, rather than the electro-mechanical device used in the present 
windshield-display system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Low-altitude bombing tests made in an F9F- 8 airplane with the standard 
Navy cross -pointer indicator and with the tracking- type windshield d~splay 
described herein showed slight differences in practice-bomb random miss 
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distances . However ) these did not appear l arge enough to affect appreci -
ably the bomb miss on a tactical mi ssion . For example, in high- angle 
(1200 ) "over- the - shoulder" releases the mean radial error was reduced 
from 31 5 feet for the standard system to 269 feet for the windshiel d-
display system. The standard devi ations of the range and deflection com-
ponents were 197 feet and 324 feet) respectively, for the standard system, 
and 130 feet and 289 feet for the windshi eld- display system. However) in 
medium- angle (41° ) "loft" releases the mean radial error increased slightly 
from 201 feet for the standard system to 230 feet for the windshield-
display system . 
There were noticeabl e differences in pilot techni~ues and tracking 
performance among the many pil ots who performed preliminary flights . 
However) the observed differences in bomb miss were small for the two 
project pilots ) and their data were grouped together for analysis . Addi -
tion of an error- integral signal in the normal - acceleration channel of 
the windshield displ ay resulted in moderate but inconsistent differences 
in measured bomb -mi ss distances . For simplicity these data have been 
grouped to facil itate the numerical comparisons above . With both types 
of low-altitude bombing (LAB ) systems a progressive change in bomb miss 
from run to run was observed . Thi s effect is associated with changes in 
the airplane angle of attack at release due to gross weight changes with 
fuel consumption . Although accurate fuel consumption data were not avail -
able ) approximate corrections were made to t he present data) and it appears 
that this factor should be considered in tactical applications . 
There were strong indications that errors in instrument tracking 
accounted for only a small part of the random bomb miss . In turn) it 
appears that these measured random miss di s tances repre sent a lesser part 
of the over-all bomb miss to be expected on a tactical mission . This 
fact suggests that attention should be concentrated on reduction of LAB 
error sources other than tracking - for example) the prediction and 
compensation for wind . 
Despite the absence of appreciable i mprovement in bombing accuracy) 
t he wi ndshield display was highly regarded by the pilots . While there 
were suggestions for minor i mprovements) t he pilots generally found the 
windshield displ ay a natural one ) easy to learn and t o fly with confidence . 
These favorable opinions leave open the pos sibility that the windshield-
display concept might be applied fruitfully to other instrument fli ght 
p roblems in which continuous and p recise control of the fli ght path are 
of greater over-all importance . 
Ames Aeronautical Laboratory 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
Moffett Field) Calif .) Sept . 10) 1956 
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APPENDIX 
DESCRI PTION OF COMPONENTS 
Figure 5 is a block diagram of the windshield- display system. The 
el evation and azimuth drive motors , microsyn pickoffs, and the mirror 
gimbal are all integral components of the modified A-l sight head shown 
19 
in figure 4 . Here the path of the light beam to the fixed and moving 
mi rror assemblies is illustrated . The fixed mirror is a specially treated 
piece of glass added to the sight head to create the fixed- dot image . The 
moving mirror gimbal is positioned by direct- current motors which are 
driven by a conventional servo amplifier, the microsyns providing the 
alternating- current feedback signals . A 400-cycles - per-second signal 
system is used throughout to permit stable amplification without excessive 
complication . When direct current is necessary, 400-cps chopper demodu-
lators are utilized . A separate 28- volt d- c to 110-volt a - c 400 cps 
inverter is employed as a pri mary power source for the entire system for 
compl ete isolation from any aircraft 400- cps sources . 
The error signals are derived at the summing junctions of the error-
signal ampl ifiers in each channel . In the elevation channel the amplified 
output of a Schaevitz linear accelerometer, oriented to measure the air-
craft ' s normal -acceleration component (AZ), is compared with the output 
of a linear differential transformer (linearsyn) pickoff which senses the 
contour of the program cam. The programmer unit (fig . 3 ) contains the 
constant- speed motor, acceleration- program cam, the linearsyn pickoff , and 
the sequencing and program reset rel ays and switches . The roll- and yaw-
axis gi mbal pickoffs are wire -wound potentiometers and, for proper opera-
tion i n this system, were excited by a 400- cps voltage balanced against 
ground . The roll and yaw sensitivity controls were located in the pilot ' s 
control panel until the sensitivity tests were completed , when they were 
replaced wi th fixed attenuators . The error- signal amplifiers are of 
conventional design and are virtually identical except for the pilot ' s 
acceleration error control i n the el evation channel. This control was 
omitted from the azimuth channel because the roll and yaw sensitivity 
controls had the same effect . The i ntegrator was of the simpl est variety, 
employing an RC network with a time constant of 50 seconds , which permits 
a sufficiently accurate integration to the time of release which had a 
maximum value of about 13 to 14 seconds. A switch to select integrator 
operati on and a sensitivity potentiometer are provided for the pilot . It 
is to be borne in mind that in the construction of this equipment no 
attempt t o miniaturize or optimize the various components was made . Off-
the - shelf components available at the Laboratory were used whenever 
possi~le to minimize development time. 
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TABLE I. - INDIVIDUAL BOMB-DROP DATA 
(a) Flight condition: 0/8 integrator out 
Measured miss, ft Random error, ft 
Flight Range cor- Radial cor-Direction 
no . Range Deflection Range rected for Deflection rected for gross weight gross weight 
error error 
8 58 1229 509 279 259 3Bo 
8 -656 1082 - 206 - 206 ll2 234 
l N 493 - Bo l42 27 -l27 l29 
8 -752 600 - 302 -72 - 370 376 
N 210 l73 - l41 - 27 l26 128 
8 -462 l58 62 -l68 34 17l 
N -42l -600 254 24 41 47 
2 8 -322 - 31 202 202 -155 254 
N - 828 -494 
-l53 -153 147 212 
8 -787 246 - 263 
- 33 122 126 
N -176 - 828 -101 129 -187 227 
(b) Flight condition : o 8 int~rator in 
8 ll40 970 375 101 208 231 
N -418 915 141 -133 445 464 
3 8 8ll 832 46 46 70 84 N -460 577 99 99 107 146 
8 345 484 420 -146 -278 314 
N -Boo - 83 - 241 33 -553 554 
8 810 1600 25 -ll2 200 229 
N - 560 -79 298 24 -356 357 
4 8 760 1200 - 25 ll2 - 200 229 
N -1082 422 - 224 -224 145 267 
N 
-932 488 -74 200 2ll 291 
8 1000 1400 230 -44 -23 50 
N 
-155 15 347 73 584 589 
5 N - 390 - 863 ll2 ll2 -294 315 
8 540 1445 -230 44 22 49 
N -962 - 858 - 460 -186 -282 '144 
8 273 620 288 -96 -230 249 
8 212 608 227 ll7 -242 269 
6 8 -189 1610 -174 -147 760 774 
8 -146 1065 -l31 33 215 218 
s - 225 348 -210 91 -502 510 
N - 2016 -682 l03 -171 74 186 
s 2245 31 90 - 47 -530 533 
7 N - 2071 -469 48 48 287 291 
s 2066 1091 - 89 47 530 532 
N - 226~ -lil8 -l50 124 - '162 '18'1 
S -36 0 3Bo 106 - 83 135 
s - 302 331 ll4 -23 248 249 
8 8 -266 102 150 150 19 151 
s -718 -270 - 302 -169 - 353 391 
8 -758 254 - '142 -68 171 184 
8 -386 193 396 122 - 65 l38 
s 
-755 162 27 -llO -96 146 
9 8 -772 498 10 10 240 240 
s -868 103 - 86 -51 -155 163 
s -ll31 335 - 349 -75 77 107 
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TABLE 1. - INDIVIDUAL BOMB- DROP DATA. - Continued 
Cc) F~ight condition : loft integrator out 
Measured mi ss) ft Random error) ft 
Flight Range cor- Radial cor-Di rection rected for rected for no . Range Deflection Range Deflection 
gross weight gr oss weight 
error error 
S 680 175 -140 35 57 67 
N 1161 795 -335 -160 310 349 
10 s 822 82 2 2 -36 36 N 1472 527 -24 -24 42 47 
S 958 98 138 -37 -20 41 
N 1854 111 158 183 -352 396 
S -827 98 -373 -198 43 203 
N -792 8 -512 -337 - 213 398 
11 s -361 -186 93 93 -241 258 N 
- 353 512 -73 -73 291 300 
S 
-173 253 281 106 198 224 
N 304 143 584 409 -1B 416 
Cd) Flight condition: loft integrator in 
S -42 450 6 6 321 321 
12 S -40 
-75 8 8 -204 204 
s -62 13 -14 -14 -li6 117 
N 209 248 -120 -120 -39 382 
s -404 -4 363 363 -li8 383 
13 N 208 521 -121 -121 234 126 
s -li31 232 -364 -364 li8 263 
N 569 93 240 240 -194 309 
s 
-959 267 -153 -153 -45 159 
s -772 227 34 34 - 85 92 
14 S - 646 72 160 160 -240 288 
s -881 532 -75 -75 220 232 
S -770 462 36 36 150 154 
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TABLE 1. - INDIVIDUAL BOMB-DROP DATA - Concluded 
(e ) Flight condition : l oft standard system 
Measured miss , f t Random error , ft 
Flight Range cor- Radial cor-Direction rected for rected for no . Range Defl ection Range gross weight Deflection gross weight 
error error 
N -527 165 152 152 54 161 
8 -731 536 -248 - 248 7 248 
15 N -881 205 -202 -202 14 202 
8 -235 522 248 248 -7 :~48 
N -610 287 49 49 -68 81 
8 -948 -262 -160 -160 14 161 
N -823 -137 -123 -123 -132 180 
16 8 -658 -204 130 130 72 149 N -728 -163 -28 - 28 -158 160 
s 
- 757 -361 31 31 -85 286 
N 
-5--LO 286 159 150 291- 127 
17 N - 254 105 24 24 -195 196 
N - 301 495 -23 - 23 -195 139 
s -276 53 -168 -168 -12 168 
N 60 -400 63 63 - 220 229 
18 s -157 -179 -49 -49 -244 249 N 72 -92 75 75 88 116 
8 110 322 218 218 257 337 
N -140 -47 -137 -137 I II 191 
(f) FliEbt condition : 0/8 standard system 
8 960 130 -74 -225 - 64 233 
N 918 212 355 204 -431 476 
19 s 1322 155 288 288 - 39 290 N 459 992 -104 -104 349 364 
8 817 298 - 217 -66 104 123 
N 111 725 -254 -101 82 111 
8 -783 -153 293 142 -194 240 
N 1145 569 287 136 236 ~72 
20 S -816 178 260 260 137 293 N 760 -458 -98 -98 -792 798 
S -1629 97 - 553 -402 56 405 
N 669 890 -189 -38 556 557 
s tJ45 -950 367 216 35 218 
N -100 -1358 130 -21 -63 66 
s 728 -918 250 250 67 258 21 N -67 -1457 163 160 -162 227 
8 -139 -1086 -617 -466 -101 476 
N -522 -1071 - 292 -141 224 264 
s 2241 4 202 51 -69 86 
N 
-995 -282 478 327 239 405 
s 2013 158 -26 - 26 85 89 22 N -1508 -1200 -35 - 35 -679 679 
s 1862 58 -177 - 26 -15 30 
N -1915 -82 -442 -291 439 526 
8 839 540 276 125 172 212 
N -28 160 442 291 248 382 
s 555 455 -8 -8 87 89 23 N - 472 -400 -2 -2 -312 312 
S 294 109 - 269 -118 -295 317 
N -910 -25 - 440 -289 63 295 
s 700 379 447 296 315 432 
N 498 402 224 73 423 429 
24 8 330 -729 77 77 -793 251 N 23 -171 -251 -251 -150 2~" 
8 -272 541 -525 -374 477 606 
N 300 -294 26 lJ7 -173 325 
s 227 -110 47 -2~ - 433 433 
N -38 545 247 96 23 31 
25 N -298 825 -13 -13 305 305 
s 134 756 -46 30 433 434 
N -518 190 -211 -82 - 310 340 
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TABLE II . - SUMMARY OF RANDOM ERROR ANALYSI S 
ax 
Flight condition Number cry ax component 
of deflection range corrected 
runs component , component, for gross IManeuve r Display system ft ft weight error , 
ft 
I ntegrator 36 313 233 III i n 
Windshield 
I ntegrator 11 202 244 147 
O/S out 
Combined 47 289 239 130 
Standard 41 324 287 197 
I ntegrator 13 179 177 177 in 
Windshield 
I nt egrator 12 196 305 184 
out Loft 
Comb i ned 25 188 249 181 
Standard 19 149 141 141 
- --_._-
Mean 
radial 
error , 
ft 
351 
266 
332 
392 
233 
349 
288 
201 
Mean r adial 
er ror 
corrected 
for gross 
!Weight e,rror , 
ft 
288 
208 
269 
317 
233 
228 
230 
201 
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Figure 1.- An idealized l ow-altitude bombing maneuver . 
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Figure 2 .- Diagrams of the two low- altitude bombing systems . 
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Figure 4.- Cutaway view of the A-l s i ght- head optical projector . 
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Figure 5. - Block diagram of the windshi eld-display low- al titude bombing syst em. 
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Figure 6.- General view of the test airplane, a Grumman F9F-8, BuAer No . 131086. A-20186 
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Figure 7.- General view of left- hand side of the test- airplane nose compartment showi ng details 
of equipment installation. 
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Figure 8.- Close-up view of the cockpit sight head and camera installation. A-20640. 3 
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Figure 9.- Detail view of the right-hand cockpit console of the test airplane showing the instal-
lation of the pilot's control panel . 
-~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
:t> 
\Jl 
0\ 
H 
f-' 
o 
o 
o 
~ § 
~ 
Lv 
Lv 
, 
o 
o 
~ 
H 
ti1 
~ 
~ 
,------' Reference line 
.---- -' Yaw error 
.---,Deflection mirror position 
Elevation mirror position 
Maneuver initiation 
Acceleration command 
'-----,Acceleration error 
'----- Timer 
Figure 10.- Typical color oscillograph record of low- al titude bombi ng loft maneuver . 
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A-21931 
Figure 11.- Selected frame s from a movie taken with the GSAP camera during 
a typical low-altitude bombing maneuver. 
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Figure 12.- Example bomb plot illustrating various bombing- error factors. 
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Figure 13.- Plots of bomb impact points referred to the group mean point 
of impact . 
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Figure 13 .- Continued . 
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Figure 13 .- Concluded . 
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Figure 14 .- Example pr obability plots . 
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Figure 14.- Concl uded . 
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Figure 15 .- Acceleration- command cam profiles . 
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(c ) Windshield displ ay , integrator i n, smooth air . 
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Figur e 16 .- Typical variations in normal - acceleration tracking performance. 
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(f) Windshield d i splay , i ntegrator out , 2 . 5- second entry. 
Figure 16 .- Concluded . 
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Figure 17 .- Ti me h i stori es of the mean normal acceleration with standard 
deviation boundaries . 
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Figure 17 .- Concluded . 
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Figure 18.- Typical yaw-error time histories . 
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